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INTRODUCTION

Entering law school with a master's degree in sociology, I
expected to encounter the same rigorous training in methodology
that I encountered in graduate school. I envisioned a scientific
approach to the study of law similar to that advocated by
Langdell Hall, a late Professor of Harvard Law School, who
posited that judicial decisions should be dissected like
experiments in a laboratory. Much to my surprise, the great bulk
of methodological training I received was based on the Socratic
method and how to argue both sides of an issue. Legal Methods
class trained us how to find the law using the law library,
Westlaw, etc., and how to write memoranda in conformity with
the Harvard Blue Book. However, it offered little formal training
in "theoretical" decision-making.
I soon came to realize that most, if not all, law schools
today do not teach clearly articulated methodologies for legal
analysis. As far back as 1976, Judge Ruggero Aldisert, of the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, addressed his dismay over the
lack of formal attention given to the judicial decision-making
process in law schools. To bridge this gap, he compiled an
anthology of writings from the pinnacles of the legal profession
on the bundle of components that go into making a judicial
decision. He titled his work, The Judicial Process.2 In his
Preface, Judge Aldisert said:
The impetus to prepare this book came to me from
teaching a variety of law school courses at the
University of Pittsburgh and the University of
2

RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS : READINGS, MATERIALS

AND CASES (West. Pub. Co. 1976).
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Texas. I found a void, appalling at times, in
student understanding and appreciation of judicial
dispute settling, error correcting, and law making at trial and on appeal.
I found too much
dogmatism: at one extreme, fixed ideas that the
law is only what free-wheeling judges say it is; at
the other, a naivete that the written opinion
represents not only a justification for the stated
conclusion, but also a true account of the process
by which that conclusion was reached. A source
of special concern to me was that many students,
perhaps the great bulk of them, candidly admitted
having given no thought to many components of
the judicial process - even the more controversial
ones - notwithstanding that their academic legal
training derived principally from the case system.
This book seeks to fill the void I found.3
Similarly, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Chief Judge Judith
S. Kaye and former Associate Judge Richard D. Simons of the
New York Court of Appeals, have lamented the inadequacy of
legal methods training in law schools.
Chief Judge Kaye,
echoing sentiments by Justice Scalia, called for more theoretical
training in statutory interpretation. 4 And Judge Simons expressed
a need for New York State to develop a consistent methodology
5
for interpretation of the New York State Constitution.
Speaking on how she decides cases, Chief Judge Kaye has
noted that she "often" refers to, and is guided by, a series of
lectures by the late Judge (and Justice) Benjamin N. Cardozo,
published in his famous work entitled The Nature of the Judicial

IId. at XVII-XIX

4 Judith S. Kaye, Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, 13 Touro

L. Rev. 595, 604-611 (1997).
'David E. McCraw, "Doubts about Our Processes": RichardD. Simons and
the Jurisprudence of Restraint in State Constitutional Analysis, 13 Touro L.
Rev. 613, 614 (1997).
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Process.6 In those lectures, Judge Cardozo posited that judges
legislate "interstitially" when charting the course of the common
law. 7 He believed a value judgment is behind every decision that
could be decided either way based on the precedents. Cardozo
argued that whenever possible, it is the judge's duty to repress his
or her own subjective values and apply the values and mores of8
the community at large when choosing which course to follow.
He said that judges must think like legislators. 9 And he called
upon the legal profession to employ the methods of sociology to
objectively determine the values and mores of the contemporary
community that are essential in order for courts to properly
decide cases.' 0
This article discusses sociological jurisprudence and the
application of sociological methodology to legal analysis.

Although law is not a pure science, there should be a scientific
approach to law study.' 1 A scientific approach would have the
pedagogical advantages of sensitizing law students to the discreet

cognitive elements (whether conscious or unconscious) that
comprise the judicial decision-making process and its final
product, the decision.
6 Judith

S. Kaye, "Hugh Jones Remembered, " N.Y.L.J., March 19 2001, at 2

(referring to BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

(Yale
University Press 1921)).
7
CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 69.
Id. at 74, 112-13.
9 Id. at 120.
10 Id. at 65-66.
1 Legal analysis is not amenable to pure scientific analysis because it can
never demonstrate causal relationships. In science, we proceed from the "null
hypothesis," which is a presumption that our hypothesis that "a is caused by
b" is wrong. In medical science, experimentation and replication must
establish a 99% probability of outcome in order to rebut the null hypothesis; in
the social sciences, a 95% probability of outcome is required. However, since
case law analysis is always an analysis of the facts after the events have
occurred, there is no way to manipulate the facts (i.e., the independent
variables) to directly measure their affect on the outcome. Only indirectly do
we "infer" a causal connection by correlating the presence of certain facts to a
particular outcome (e.g., "judgment for plaintiff;" or "reversed" or
"affirmed").
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HISTORICAL TRENDS IN LEGAL METHODOLOGY

Historically, the evolution of legal training in the United
States has corresponded with the scientific and philosophical
zeitgeists of the time. Early in our Nation's history law students
(at that time, guilded into the profession) were taught that judicial
decisions were derived from rules of law which were derived
from first principles. 12 These "natural law" theorists, such as
Blackstone, as he described in his Commentaries, believed judges
must look up and ponder the heavens to discover the first
principles that would guide them to render just decisions. 13 This
methodology, not surprisingly, was deeply grounded in Judeo14
Christian philosophy.
The natural law theory came into disfavor with the advent
of the 18th century's "scientific revolution" and the school of
Legal Positivism became the vogue. 15 These empiricists rejected
the notion that judicial decisions were components of immutible
first principles. Influenced by the philosopher Thomas Hobbes'
theory that men entered into a "social contract" because life for
man in a state of nature was "short and brutish," the Positivists
viewed all laws, whether legislative or judicial, as nothing more
than commandments by the sovereign. The threat of force by
12 See HAROLD J. BERMAN & WILLIAM R. GREINER,

THE NATURE AND

FUNCTION OF THE LAW 478 (4' ed., The Foundation Press 1980).
13 See

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

BLACKSTONE'S

COMMENTARIES

Tucker ed., 1803).
14 See Norman Kretzman, Lex Iniust A Non Est Lex:

(George

Laws On Trial in

Acquinas' Court of Conscience, in JOEL FEINBERG & HYMAN GRoss,
PILOSOPHY OF LAW 7-13 (5th ed., Wadsworth 1995) ("Morality has an
essential connection with Christian Theology

. . .I).

/d.at 7. In England,

natural law methodology was employed by the Ecclesiastical Courts which
invoked maxims as first principles from which to deduce the desired outcome.
The law courts employed a rigid Positivism methodology, which, due to the
exacting pleading requirements and limited writs (or causes of action)

available, gave impetus for the rise of courts of equity. In the United States,
on the other hand, due to the merger of law and equity in courts of general
jurisdiction, the natural law theory early on became the dominant methodology
for all claims - legal and equitable.
15FEINBERG

& GRoss, supra note 14, at 3.
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society is what compels conformance; that is the sine qua non of
the law. 16 The rejection of value consideration in judicial
thinking resulted in decisions that sometimes lacked indicia of
fairness. Judicial decisions were read by practitioners with an
eye to simply plucking out useful phrases and arguing deductively
from them. This led to criticism of Legal Positivism as slot
machine justice, and "mechanical jurisprudence." 17
The school of Legal Realism, a 19th Century outgrowth of
18th century French Socialist philosophy, modified the Legal
Positivists' position by recognizing that a value choice is implicit
in all decision-making. 18 The Realists noted, however, that
judges were overwhelmingly from the privileged class; thus, their
attitudes reflected the attitudes of that class. Therefore, the Legal
Realists perceived justice as incorporating the values of the
dominant group in society. Laws are made and enforced to
uphold the values of the dominant class. But the dominant class
does not necessarily reflect the majority of the population; rather,
it reflects the most politically powerful group in society.19
The school of Sociological Jurisprudence arose out of the
disapproval of the "heartless" justice that was dispensed under
16See

John Austin, A Positivist Conception of Law, in FEINBERO & GROSS,

supra note 14, at 31-42; H.L.A. Hart, A More Positive Positivist Conception
of Law, in FEINBERG & GROSS, supra note 14, at 42-56. Holmes echoed this
conception of law when he said, "People want to know under what
circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so
much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out
when this danger is to be feared." O.W. HOLMES, THE PATH OF THE LAW
(1897), quoted in ALDISERT, supra note 2, at 27. He revealed the same
positivistic sentiment during a response to a friend who told him to "do
justice." Flabbergasted by the suggestion, Holmes responded that his job was
not to do justice, but "to play the game according to the rules." Id. at 185. It
seems, therefore, that the commentators who have characterized Justice
Holmes as a sociologically oriented jurist, are wrong.
17Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605, 609-10

(1908).
ISAndrew

Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies and Dworkin, in

FEINBERO & GROSS, supra note 14, 179.
19See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND

42-47 (Brentano's Inc.,

1930). See also CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW INTHE MAKING 1-6 (Oxford
University Press 1964).
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the Legal Positivist regime, and the cynical attitude of the Legal
Realists. 20 Although Legal Realism had its roots in radical
sociological theory, sociological jurisprudence should not be
confused with radical sociology. Sociological jurisprudence arose
during the heyday of the American sociologist, Emile Durkheim,
and the philosopher William James. Durkheim was a structural-

functionalist, who explored how social systems function. James
explored how the attitudes of society affect our belief systems and
shape our behavior. 2'
Thus, there are two aspects to sociological jurisprudence.
One is the functional, Durkheimian perspective, which focuses
on rule utilitarianism, in the Kantian sense.22 The other is the
mores aspect, which focuses on value choices implicit in judicial
decision-making. It is the latter aspect of this two-pronged
methodology that Judge Cardozo alluded to in The Nature of the
Judicial Process.23 The functionalist, or rule utilitarian aspect of
sociological jurisprudence analyzes the social context in which
lawsuits occur and how rules of law can affect social interaction.
A decision is good to the extent that it educates its citizens as to
appropriate social behavior and thereby helps people avoid social
conflict in the future. In this sense, judges and lawyers act as
social engineers by fashioning rules of conduct conducive to a
more harmonious social existence. The social values aspect of the

20
ALLEN, supra note 19, at 28.
2 t See
Enile Durkheim, Types of Law

in Relation to Types of Social Solidarity,

in SOaOLOGY OF LAW (Vilhehn Aubert ed., Penguin Books 1975), reprinted
from EMILE DuRKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 68-132 (Free
Press 1964). See also Michael Clarke, Durkheim's Sociology of Law, in
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LAW 281-290 (Dartmouth Publishing
Company 2001); WILLIAM JAMES, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (Henry Holt

1890).
22 See HERBERT JAMES PATON,

CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: A STUDY IN

KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY (University of Pennsylvania 1999).

See also

ROSCoE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 198-202

(Transaction Publishers 1999, originally published by Yale University Press in
1922).
23 CAR zo, supra note 6, at 65-66.
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methodology focuses on identifying community values in judicial
decisions .24
Today, most law schools teach legal methods from an
eclectic perspective, which implicitly recognizes all the schools of
jurisprudential philosophy, but does not discretely analyze any
particular school of thought.
III.

CARDOZO'S SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE

In his lectures on The Nature of the Judicial Process,
Judge Cardozo identified and analyzed the diverse elements that
factor into judicial decisions, which includes history, logic,
positivism, realism, and sociology.25

He posited that sociology

choice: 26

was the methodology of
"From history and custom, we
pass therefore, to the force which in our day and generation is
becoming the greatest of them all, the power of social justice
which finds its outlet and expression in the method of
sociology. "27

To begin, Cardozo rejected natural law theory, "The
common law does not work from pre-established truths of
universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them
deductively.
Its method is inductive, and it draws its
See Durkheim, Clark, supra note 21. Sociological jurisprudence should not
be confused with the Economic school of jurisprudence. The Economic school
views legal rules in terms of their economic costs on society (called "external
costs"). It posits that legal rules are efficient when they place all economic
costs on the parties - or at least on the transgressor (these are called "internal
costs"). See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 11-15 ( 31h
Ed., Little, Brown & Company 1986). Sociological jurisprudence, by
contrast, judges the efficacy of rules in terms of their ability to correct or
prevent "social disruption," i.e., teach people socially acceptable behavior in
particular contexts. In other words, it is the normative force of law that
concerns the sociologically oriented jurist. See LEARNED HAND, THE
24

CONTRIBUTION OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY TO CIVILIZATION

(Mass. Bar.

Assoc. 1942).
25 CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 112 "Which of these forces shall dominate in
any case must depend largely upon the comparative importance or value of the
social interests that will be thereby promoted or impaired."
26 Id. at 30-31, 33, 165-66.
27 Id. at 65-66.
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generalizations from particulars." 28 "Hardly a rule of today but
may be matched by its opposite of yesterday. "29 "It is no longer
in texts or in systems derived from reason that we must look for
the source of law; it is in social utility, in the necessity that
30
certain consequences shall be attached to given hypothesis."
The meaning of rules must be derived from "the exigencies of
3
social life. " 1
According to Cardozo, law is "an historical growth, for it
is an expression of customary morality which develops silently
and unconsciously from one age to another." 32
"A
jurisprudence that is not constantly brought into relation to
objective or external standards incurs the risk of degenerating
into.. . a jurisprudence of mere sentiment or feeling." 3 3 "The
constant assumption runs throughout the law that the natural and
spontaneous evolutions of habit fix the limits of right and wrong.
A slight extension of custom identifies it with customary
morality, the prevailing standard of right conduct, the mores of
the time. "34 Thus, every high court must periodically "review its
precedents and bring them up to date with the mores by a
continual restatement and by giving them a continually new
35
content."
Because a judge is called upon to choose from competing
positions, she must think and act as a legislator: "[S ] he ought to
shape h[er] judgment of the law in obedience to the same aims
which would be those of a legislator who was proposing to
himself to regulate the question. " 36 In this regard, Cardozo
acknowledged a deep tension flowing from "a stream of tendency
[in each of us], whether you choose to call it philosophy or not,

21 Id.

at 23.

29

1d. at26.
3°Id. at 122.
31 CARDOzO, supra note 5, at 122.
32

33

id..

Id. at 106.
34 Id. at 63
35 Id. at 135.
36 CARDOzo, supra note 6, at 120.
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" 37
which gives coherence and direction to thought and action.
Therefore, a difficult job of the judge is to put aside his or her
own subjective feelings, 38 and rule according to "the opinions
generally prevailing among
the community regarding transactions
39
like those in question."

The interpreter ...

must above all things put aside

his estimate of political and legislative values, and
must endeavor to ascertain in a purely objective
spirit what ordering of the social life of the
community comports best with the aim of the law
in question in the circumstances before him.4 °
[S]elf search and reproach must come at moments
to the man who finds himself summoned to the
duty of shaping the progress of the law.... My
duty as judge may be to objectify the law, not my
own aspirations and convictions and philosophies,
but the aspirations and convictions and
philosophies of the men and women of my time.4'
According to Cardozo, the method of sociology best
enables a judge to perform her legislative function because it
provides the tools to help her to identify and measure the
contemporary social values that must be understood in order for a
judge to make legal rulings conducive to the social welfare.42
43
Sociological thinking is a means-end analysis:

We are thinking of the end which the law serves,
and fitting its rules to the task of service ...

This

3 Id. at 12.
38 Id. at 111.
39

40
"'

Id. at 74.

Id. at 90 (quoting BRuTr, DIE KUNTS DER RECHTSANWENDUNG 57).
CARDozo, supra note 6, at 172-73.

Id. at 65-66, 71.
43
Id. at 98.
42
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conception of the end of the law as determining the
direction of its growth... finds its organon, its
instrument, in the method of sociology. Not the
origin,
but
the
goal,
is
the
main
44
thing... [P]ragmatism.
Sociological jurisprudence is a functionalist methodology
in that it alters the emphasis "from the content [conception] of the
precept and the existence of the remedy to the effect [function] of
the precept in action and the availability and efficiency of45the
remedy to attain the ends for which the precept was devised."
Cardozo explains the dilemma a judge facees when in
rendering a decision she must choose among legitimate values
competing for preeminence. That choice ordinarily presents itself
after the judge "extracts from the [cases] the underlying
principle, the ratio decidendi; he must then determine the path or
direction along which the principle is to move and develop, if it is
not to wither and die." 46 "The problem," he said, "remains to
fix the bounds and the tendencies of development and growth, to
set the directive force in motion along the right path at the parting
47
of the ways. "
One principle or precedent, pushed to the limit of
its logic, may point to one conclusion; another
principle or precedent, followed with a like logic,
may point with equal certainty to another. In this
conflict, we must choose between the two paths,
selecting one or other, or perhaps striking out upon
a third, which will be the resultant force of the two
forces in combination, or will represent the mean
between extremes.48
4Id. at 102.
41 Id. at 73 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Administrative Application of Legal

Standards, Proceedings ABA, 441-449 (1919).
467 CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 28.
4 Id.at 29.
48 Id. at 40.
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Methods Of Identifying Social Values

Legal scholars and practitioners have utilized three
techniques to search out and identify social values to assist judges
in choosing the path to follow: use of the "Brandies brief,"
which incorporates social science studies; resort to analogous
statutes, which evidence societal value choices; and distilling the
value choices inherent in prior reported judicial decisions .4 9 The
efficacy of this last technique depends in part on the analyst
comparing decisions of judges from different racial and ethnic
backgrounds. Inclusion of the value choices of diverse groups
within the community will increase the likelihood of correctly
identifying broad-based value-consensus on the particular subject.
B.

Development Of Principles

Social considerations provide bases for reasons, and
reasons stated in sufficiently general terms are called principles.
Cardozo found that the "implications of a decision may in the
beginning, be equivocal.
New cases by commentary and
exposition extract the essence. At last there emerges a rule or
principle which becomes a datum, a point of departure, from
which new lines will be run, from which new courses will be
50
measured. "
C.

Application To Statutes
Statutes are to be viewed, not in isolation or in
vacuo, as pronouncements of abstract principles
for the guidance of an ideal community, but in the
setting and the frame-work of present-day
conditions, as revealed by the labors of economists
and students of the social sciences in our own
country and abroad. 51

9 ALDISERT,
50 CARDOZO,

supra note 2, at 317-18 (citations omitted).
supra note 6, at 48.

Id. at 81.
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Sociological jurisprudence does not inquire into what a
legislator thought a century ago, but what she would have thought
had she been aware of the present conditions.5 2
D.

Application To Constitutional Law

In the context of constitutional law analysis, sociological
jurisprudence requires an interpretivist jurisprudential philosophy.
Contemporary community mores and values implies an "evolving
standards of decency" philosophy. Accordingly, the meaning of
the words in a Constitution must evolve as we evolve.53
IV.

CASE LAW EXAMPLES

An example of sociological jurisprudence is evidenced in
McPherson v. Buick, where Cardozo, wroting for the New York
Court of Appeals, held an automobile manufacturer liable for
injuries resulting from a defective wheel.54
Plaintiff had
purchased the vehicle from a retailer; as such, there was no
privity of contract between plaintiff and the manufacturer.55
Prior cases had created an arbitrary classification distinguishing
items deemed "imminently dangerous" from items deemed
"inherently dangerous" (i.e., items which could be made
imminently dangerous by a negligent act).56 For example, a
52

Id. at 84. For examples of this sort of post hoc statutory construction, see

Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 74 N.Y.2d 201 (1989), where a plurality of the
Court interpreted the term "family member" in a rent control statute drafted in
1946 to include a deceased tenant's homosexual partner. (Certainly the
Legislature in 1946 did not contemplate that result!)
53 Obviously, followers of the "noninterpretivist" school of constitutional
law,
which presently dominates among Justices of the United States Supreme Court,
strenuously disagree that the meaning of the words of the United States

Constitution should evolve as we evolve. They also eschew interpretation of a
statute beyond its "plain meaning."

See ANTHONY SCALiA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE LAw (Princeton University
Press 1997).
'4 217 N.Y. 382, 394 (1917)
35 Id.

1

Id. at 385.
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loaded gun, mislabeled poison, defective hair wash, scaffolds, a
defective coffee urn, and a defective aerated bottle were
considered imminently dangerous;
whereas a defective
manufacture of a carriage, a bursting lamp, a balance wheel for a
circular saw, and a boiler, were deemed inherently dangerous.
The older cases allowed third parties, not in privity with the
manufacturer, to sue the manufacturer only if the item was
considered "imminently dangerous. " 57 Cardozo rejected the
distinction as reflecting a misguided jurisprudence of conceptions
(mechanical jurisprudence), calling the distinction mere "verbal
niceties." 58 Rather, he fashioned a functional rule designed to
protect people living in a modern society: "If danger was to
reasonably certain, there was a duty of vigilance, regardless of
59
whether the danger was characterized as inherent or imminent."
Therefore, "[i]f the nature of an item is such that it is reasonably
certain to place life and limb in peril, when negligently made, it
is then an item of danger." 60
When Cardozo wrote the decision in McPherson,
automobiles were traveling farther and faster than ever before;
automobiles had become the transportation of choice for most
Americans; and injuries resulting from automobile accidents were
dramatically rising. Cardozo later contrasted the legal method of
analysis he employed with the method employed in the prior
cases, as a "struggle" between "utility" and blind adherence to
"logic. "61

Another

good

example

of Cardozo's

sociological

jurisprudence at work is Hynes v. New York Central Rail Co..62

That case involved an attractive nuisance, where a plank extended
into the Harlem River on property owned by the railroad. The
plank was used as a diving board by trespassing children.
Electrical wires hung overhead that were attached to a wooden
s Id. at 386.
SId. at 394.

McPherson, 217 N.Y. at 394.
60 Id. at 389.
59

N.CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 77-80 (Yale University
Press 1924).
62 231 N.Y. 229 (1921).
61 BENJAMIN
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poll (the wires had been placed there by the railroad). A child
was struck and killed when an electrical wire came loose and
struck the child as he was preparing to dive; the child was
plunged to his death in the water below. 63 The railroad argued
that it did not owe a duty of care to the child because he was a
trespasser. The railroad admitted that if the child's feet had not
been on the plank at the moment the wires struck him, he would
have been in the public waterway and the railroad would have
been liable. But the child was technically a tresspasser because
he had not yet commenced his dive. 64 Nonetheless, the court
found the railroad liable.65 Speaking for the Court again, Judge
Cardozo said,
Rights and duties in systems of living law are not
built upon such quicksands .... This case is a
striking instance of the dangers of a "jurisprudence
of
conceptions"
(Pound,
Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 Col. L. Rev. 605, 608, 610), the
extension of a maxim or a definition with relentless
disregard of consequences to "a dryly logical
66
extreme.
V.

A.

OTHER SEMINAL MATERIALS ON LEGAL METHODS
67
Karl Llwewllyn, The Bramble Bush
In The Bramble Bush, Karl. Llewellyn stated:

The practice of our case law, however, is I think
fairly stated thus: it pays to be suspicious of
63 Id.at 231.

64 Id. at 235.

Id. at 236.
66 Id. at 235. See also FRANK, supra note 19, at 70-72 ("Formal logic is what
its name indicates; it deals with form and not with substance. The syllogism
will not supply either the major or the minor premise. The 'joker' is to be
found in the selection of these premises." Id. at 66.)
67 KARL. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 42-53 (New York, 1951)
(quoted in BERMAN & GREINER, supra note 12, 487).
65
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general rules which look too wide; it pays to go
slow in feeling certain that a wide rule has been
laid down at all, or that, if seemingly laid down, it
will be followed.68
[N]o case can have meaning by itself! Standing
alone it gives you no guidance. It can give you no
guidance as to how far it carries, as to how much
of its language will hold water later. What counts,
what gives you leads, what gives you sureness,
that is the backgroundof the other cases in relation
to which you must read the one. They color the
language, the technical terms, used in the opinion.
But above all they give you wherewithal to find
which of the facts are significant, and in what
aspect they are significant, and how far the rules
laid down are to be trusted. 69
According to
Development of Principles:
1.
Llewellyn, principles emerge from generalization of the common
facts taken from cases decided the same way, from which lawyers
and judges synthesize a rule that will encompass those cases.
Generalization is accomplished when the language (i.e., concept
formation) is broad enough to fit the cases, but not broader than

necessary. 70

68

Id.

& GREINER, supra note 12, at 491. See also Paul T. Wangerin,
Skills Training in "Legal Analysis": A Systematic Approach, 40 U. Miami L.
Rev. 409, 449 (1986) ("to create an use a synthesis, students or lawyers must
formulate a single proposition and then support it by reference to two, three,
or more previously decided cases or legal authorities. In short, a synthesis is a
single legal idea followed by a listing of several authorities. Individual past
cases, by themselves, are not important in the context of that skill. They are
important only because groups of them lend support to an overall proposition
or idea.").
70 LLEWELLYN, supra note 68.

69 BERMAN
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2.
Two types of Principle Construction: Llewellyn
speaks of a two step process to developing principle: "intuitional
correction of hypothesis;" and "experimental test of whether an
hypothesis is sound."
Experimental is case law analysis.
Intuitional correction of hypothesis, is often the beginning of
legal problem solving; it involves hypothetical reasoning. It
requires analyzing the implications of the holdings in judicial
decisions from the narrowest to the broadest implication of each
holding. Next, set the maximum against the minimum; that will
suggest how far a court may go in extending the precedents. 7 '
3.
Llewellyn:

Understanding the Raio Decidendi: According to

The third thing that needs saying as you set
to matching cases, is that on your materials, often
indeed on all the materials that there are, a perfect
working out of comparison and difference cannot
be had. In the first case you have facts a and b
and c, procedural set-up m, and outcome x. In the
second case you have, if you are lucky, procedural
set-up m, but this time with facts a and b and d,
and outcome y. How, now, are you to know with
any certainty whether the changed result is due in
the second instance to the absence of fact c or the
presence of the new fact d? The court may tell
you. But I repeat: your object is to test the telling
of the court. You turn to your third case. Here
71

Id. at 60-69 (quoted in

supra note 2, at 822). Speaking on the
same method of analysis in the social sciences, WALTER L. WALLACE, THE
LOGIC OF SCIENCE IN SOCIOLOGY 50 (Aldine de Gruyter Pub. 1971), described
the process as follows:
ALDISERT,

At first we operate only with thought abstractions, mindful of our task only to
construct inner representation-pictures. Proceeding this way, we don not as
yet take possible experiential facts [case law] into consideration, but merely
make an effort to develop our own thought pictures with as much clarity as

possible and to draw from them all possible consequences. Only subsequently,
after the entire exposition of the picture has been completed, do [we] check its
agreement with experiential facts [i.e., case law]. (citations omitted).
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once more is the outcome x, and the facts are b
and c and e; but fact a is missing, and the
procedural set-up this time is not m but n. This
strengthens somewhat your suspicion that fact c is
the lad who works the changed result. But an
experimentation crucis still is lacking. Cases in
life are not made to our hand.
A scientific
approach to prediction we may have, and we may
use it as far as our materials will permit. An exact
science in result we have not now. Carry this in
your minds: a scientific approach, no more. Onto
the green, with luck, your science takes you. But
when it comes to putting you will work by art and
hunch.72
B.

73
Edward Levi, An Introduction To Legal Reasoning

In An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, Edward Levi
echoed Llwellyn's sentiments, stating: "the scope of a rule of
,law, and therefore its meaning, depends upon a determination of
what facts will be considered similar to those present when the
rule was first announced. The finding of similarity or difference
is the key step in the legal process.74
Looking at a court's stated rule of decision, Levy says,
The statement is mere dictum, and this means that
the judge in the present case may find irrelevant
the existence or absence of facts which prior
72 BERMAN

& GREINER, supra note 11, at 494. Uncovering the ratio decidendi

can be difficult. But a simple example is Row v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
where the Supreme Court ruled that a woman has a right to a abort a
pregnancy prior to the third trimester, when it is "viable" that the fetus could
live outside the woman's body. The decision that the fetus is not a "potential
person" (entitled to legal protection from the State) until that time is the
controversial ratiodecidendi upon which the holding depends.
73

EDWARD H.

LEvI,

AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING

(The

University of Chicago Press 1948).
74 Id. at 2
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judges thought important. It is not what the prior
judge intended that is of any importance; rather it
is what the present judge, attempting to see the law
as a fairly consistent whole, thinks should be the
determining classification ... [T]he rules are
discovered in the process of determining similarity
or difference. 75
But the problem for the law is this: "When will
it be just
76
to treat different cases as though they were the same?"
1.
Community Values: It is because the law forum is
a "moving classification system" 77 that "the ideas of the
community and of the social sciences, whether correct or not, as
they win acceptance in the community, control legal decisions." 78
2.

Legal Principles As Generalization Tools: Beware
of Misuse Of Words: According to Levi,

The first stage is the creation of the legal concept
[principles] built up as cases are compared. The
period is one in which the court fumbles for a
phrase. Several phrases may be tried out; the
misuse or misunderstanding of words itself may
have an affect. The second stage is the period
when the concept is more or less fixed, although
reasoning by example continues to classify items
inside and out of the concept. The third stage is
the break-down of the concept, as reasoning by
example has moved so far ahead as to make it clear
that the suggestive influence of the word is no
longer desired.79
7s
76

Id. at 2-3
Id. at3.
at4.

77 Id.
7
1

Id. at6.

79 LEVI, supra note

73, at 9.
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Walter Wallace (The Logic of Science in Sociology), a
social scientist, offers this advice on choosing the appropriate
word. First, (determinacy) does it lead to hypothetically logical
inconsistencies or contradictions. Second, (universality) the word
should be clear and unequivocal and not contain culture-bound
implications. Third, (flexibility) the word should be flexible in
its ability to be used in varying contexts. 80 And fourth,
(abstractness) the word should be rich in content.
And
C. Robert M. Emerson (Contemporary Field
Research), another social scientist, states that descriptions and
definitions are situational and depend on context for their
meaning. A key question in understanding a definition is what
motivating forces or intention the definer or describer had in
what perspective is the
giving his or her rendition. From
81
made?
being
definition
or
description
VI. CASE STUDY USING SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY

A.

Establishing Functional Equivalence

The heart of the case law method is reasoning by analogy.
The lawyer's primary responsibility is to demonstrate that the
relevant historical facts of her case are similar to the ultimate
facts in the decided case(s), and therefore justify the same
outcome. The initial determination of similarity is a search for
facts in common. The more facts the cases have "in common,"
the greater the perceived similarity. However, in searching for
similarities among cases, the same level of analysis must be
employed. That is what the sociological literature refers to as
Functional equivalence requires
functional equivalence.
demonstrating the interdependent relationship among the
attributes (independent variables) that are being used to measure
their effect on the matter under investigation (the dependent
variable). Prezeworski and Teune define functional equivalence
supra note 71.
M. EMERSON, CONTEMPORARY FIELD RESEARCH 34-35 (Waveland

80 WALLACE,
81

ROBERT

Press 1983).
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as the "mutual interdependence" of the indicators: "The criterion
for inferring the equivalence of measurement statements is the
similarity in the structure of the indicators. "82
The following example taken from sociology is
illustrative.
Suppose a researcher is investigating the correlation
between mental illness and aggression across cultures. She would
first have to define aggression and then search for indicators of it
in various societies. Suppose several societies which have high
incidences of mental illness also have high incidences of street
fighting. But in another society with a high incidence of mental
illness there are hardly every any street fights. This negative case
might suggest that aggression is not a causal indicator of mental
illness. But let's further suppose that society is a highly litigious
one. Here we have found functionally equivalent indicators
(independent variables) that affect (presumably measure) the
dependent variable (mental illness), i.e., street fighting and
litigiousness are both indicators of aggression.
Now the
researcher might next think of replacing the variable
"aggression" with a def'mitionally more accurate-- i.e., more
inclusive -- term that encompasses both street fighting and

lawsuits; e.g., adversity or adverserialness.
That is precisely how a functional approach to legal
reasoning should proceed. A party argues that the facts of his or
her case fit within the relief provided in a prior decision. The
rule of law that is allegedly implicit in the prior decision is a
mere conception, and can only be indirectly tested by comparison
to other cases, where the principle was presumptively applied.
But the historical facts of all the cases are different. It is the
identification and explication of their functional equivalence, by
employment of a more general, inclusive, concept that
demonstrates why two cases should be treated the same.

82 ADAM

PREZEWORSKI

&

HENRY TEUNE,

THE LOGIC OF COMPARATIVE

SOCIAL INQUIRY 129 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1970).
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B. Use Of Analogy To Demonstrate Functional Equivalence
Replacement of terms with more inclusory concepts
broaden the classificatory schemes. This is the process by which
principles and theories are constructed from case law. The
method of analogy is used for that purpose.
Let's analyze Aristotle's analogy: "Old age is to life as
evening is to day." Aristotle establishes functional equivalence
of "old age" and "evening" by describing them both as being
part of the "sunset of life." Notice that Aristotle's technique of
establishing functional equivalence in this analogy is by
classification and then deduction.
Notice, also, that analogies have meaning only when
individuals share a common frame of reference. For example, if
you believed that the concept "sunset" represented significant
qualities not present in old age, you might reject Aristotle's
comparison as inappropriate.
To guard against vicious abstraction in the employment of
more generalized concepts to take into account more than one
factor, abstraction should be limited to low range propositions.
Wangerin, in Skills Training in "Legal Analysis": A systematic
Approach, 3 provides a legal example:
[To demonstrate an analogy,] the lawyer must
show that the facts of that case, although appearing
to differ from the facts of the present dispute, do
Joint statements of facts can
not differ at all ....
be prepared by identifying in the several cases
what might be called the "lowest common
denominator" of facts. [For example, i]f one case
in a pair of cases involved a liquor store and the
other a grocery store, a common denominator of
fact would be that both cases dealt with stores
involved in the sale of "goods." However, the
term "goods" is too broad because most stores
sell goods, and a lower common denominator of
83

See e.g., Wangrin, supra note 69.
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denominator would be if both stores sold
"consumer goods." Use of this term eliminates
many types of stores, however, both the liquor
store and the grocery store fit in this category. An
even lower common denominator of facts would be
that both cases involved stores that sold
"consumable" consumer goods. Use of this term
eliminates virtually all stores except those involved
in the two cases. Thus, the term is a very low, or
may be even the lowest, common denominator of
84
fact.

Low level abstraction essentially means abstraction closely
related to the types of situations discussed in the cases. Its
necessity is based on finding justice for the case at hand. The
more simple the theory, the more likely it will be held valid. It is
preferable to take a step back from the facts, and draw as many
inferences as possible. Each inference should be predicated upon
a fact or combination of facts. When analyzing two cases, look
to the variation in time or place of occurrence.
(Think of
McPherson (p. ante) and the change in circumstances that arose
with the invention of the automobile.) Similarly, in analyzing
two different interpretations of the same set of facts, or presumed
causal factors, first determine whether the antagonists are
operating from the same point of reference.
The method of analogy is a force constantly pushing
courts to expand their holdings and include new categories of
cases within the context of a legal precept. The process usually
continues until the jurisdiction's highest court pushes the
pendulum in the opposite direction. But the process is cyclical as
the unending dimensions of life continue to unfold.

4Id.

at 451.
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The Logic Of Science In The Social Sciences

The development of social science theory (including law)
involves an intuitive back-and-forth between theory and facts.
Theory is constantly being modified to take into account new
factual insights. Because of this constant tension between theory
and fact, every theory is tentatively. And the greatest causes of
misapplication of an existing theory are lack of understanding of
its definitions or the scope of its concepts. Thus, a primer on
theory development, as it can be applied in the legal context, is in
order
1.

The Tentative Hypothesis: Intuitional Correction:

[T]he first formulation of a hypothesis deduced
from a theory may be ambiguous, imprecise,
logically
faulty,
untestable,
or
otherwise
unsatisfactory, and it may undergo several
revisions before a satisfactory formulation is
constructed. In this process, not only will the
deduced hypothesis change, but the originating
theory may also be modified as the implications of
each trial formulation reveal more about the theory
itself.85
At each step, "new observations are at least imagined and
often actually made; and from them the investigator judges not
only how relevant to his hypothesis the final observations and
empirical generalizations are likely to be, but how appropriate his
hypothesis is, given the observations and generalizations he can
make." 86 The researcher must be on guard against "'the
fetishism of the concept.'" 87
In this regard, note Judge
88
blind adherence to logic.
against
guard
to
admonition
Cardozo's
85 WALLACE,

supra note 71, at 20

86

1d. at21.

87

Id. at 22 (citation omitted).
supra note 12.

8 See CARDOZO,
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Another social scientitist states: "This moving back and
forth between observations and theory, modifying original
theoretical statements to fit observations and seeking observations
relevant to the emerging theory, characterizes the analytic process
in [case study] research. "89
2.
Identifying The Material Facts: Deciding which
facts are relevant and material to the legal issues is based, in part,
on preconceived notions of the legal significance of the chosen
facts. "'Any descriptive utterance, any observation statement is
already a hypothesis. ' ' 9° (citation omitted). Thus, the more
knowledge a lawyer or judge has in his or her legal arsenal on a
given subject, the more sensitized she will be regarding the legal
significance of the facts. In doing research, expect that the
tentative hypothesis will need to be modified (perhaps several
times) as the cases tell the lawyer which facts are material. This
is what appellate lawyers call the "back-and-forth" process of
legal research and writing.
3.
Measuring the Significance of the Facts Found in
"Measurement permits an estimate of
the Reported Cases:
sameness among observations made on different 'kinds' of
phenomena (for example, a pound of feathers equals a pound of
iron filings)."91 When identifying similar facts appearing in more
than one case, consider assigning values to the significance placed
on each fact by the courts, and the number of times the fact
appears in the decided cases. The more often a fact deemed
relevant or dispositive by one court is found in other cases
similarly decided, the greater the assurance that the facts
identified are the reason for the court's ruling.92
Qualitative coding is a technique used by social scientists
to create categories to measure data and describe the type of

89 EMERSON,

supra note 81, at 95.

9 WALLACE,

supra note 71, at 34.

9' Id. at 38 note 6.
92
Id. at 40.
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activity involved.93 The codes should fit the data; the data should
not be forced to fit a code. Codes may be based on any number
of considerations, including institutional processes or social or
business situations. View the events objectively. The purpose of
the code is a descriptive classification of the actions of the
parties. In practice, coding can be used to categorize facts
appearing in the cases and thereby facilitate comparison. This
approach can also be used to set up analogies between cases by
demonstrating that two or more factors are penumbras of a more
general concept.
4.
Converging Principles Into Theory:
"[T]heories may be viewed as emerging by making the
terms and relationships in empirical generalizations more
abstract, and also by introducing other abstract terms that refer to
94
nonobservable constructs."
The conversion of empirical uniformities
[similarities in facts among cases] into theoretic
statements
[principles] ... increases
the
fruitfulness of research through the successive
exploration of implications.
By providing a
rationale, the theory introduces a ground for
prediction which is more secure than mere
empirical extrapolation from previously observed
trends.
It is through building upon the cases to derive a theory of
the law that counsel "may ascend, via an interpretive string
[inductive], to some point in the theoretical network, thence
proceed, via definition and hypotheses, to other points, from
which another interpretative string permits a decent [deductive] to
93 Kathy Charmaz, The Grounded Theory Method:

An Explication and

Interpretation, in EMERSON, supra note 81, at 111.
94 WALLACE, supra note 71, at 53. This is the process of selecting only the
material facts that appear in the cases and describing them by use of more
general terms.
95 Id. at 56 (citations omitted).
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the plane of observation." 96 (Note that Cardozo opined that it is
during the "definition and hypothesis" phase of the analysis that
judges legislate ("interstitially").97
Furthermore, "[t]heory is generated in two main ways:
First, through constant comparison of the data the researcher
develops conceptual categories and identifies their properties.
Second, additional data are collected using theoretical sampling,
where new observations are made in order to pursue analytically
relevant concerns rather than to establish the frequency or
distribution of phenomena." 98
5. Analytic Induction:
Proponents of analytic induction ...begin with a
rough formulation of the phenomenon to be
explained and an initial hypothesis explaining the
phenomenon, then go to a small number of cases
(even a single case) to see if the hypothesis fits that
case. If not, either the hypothesis or ... [case] to
be explained is reformulated so that the case is
accounted for. The procedure then continues, with
the researcher examining cases and producing
reformulation of these sorts whenever negative
cases are encountered, until all cases can be
explained. 99
It is helpful to begin with an argument, and take a step
back and generalize it slightly. Determine if the argument is
viable under the hypothetical testing. If so, the principle is
probably correctly applied. (This test is routinely employed
during oral arguments by appellate courts.)

9 Id. at 59.
97'See CARDOzo, supra note 12.
98 EMERSON,

supra note 81.

"9Id. at 97.
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6.
The Importance of Negative Cases: A method for
dealing with negative cases is the "concomitant variation and
most different systems" design. Under this methodology, cases
are designated into two groups; i.e., those that found the
appropriate legal rule was applied, and those that found it did not
apply.
Categories depicting recurring fact patterns are
constructed based on the presence or absence of the dependent
variable (e.g., in case law analysis, the outcome). 100
Aside from the occasional wrongly decided case, it is
through studying dissimilar cases that enables learning the more
perfect definition of the subject matter. Theories are altered as
we find negative cases. The goal is to fit the negative case within
the paradigm of the new theory or principle; this is the
11
incremental step toward greater inclusion.
VII.

A PROPOSED "TENTATIVE HYPOTHESIS" FOR LEGAL
RESEARCH

The following is a prototype scientific approach to legal
research and case law analysis.
A systematic approach to this methodology is as follows:
For every legal issue, create a "tentative hypothesis" based upon
the facts of the case at hand and your knowledge of the applicable
law. The hypothesis should be placed in syllogistic form. The
major premise is a general proposition of law. The minor
premise consists of the presumed dispositive facts.
The
conclusion is the outcome you desire; it must follow from the
premises.10 2 The tentative hypothesis should be short (keep it
under 100 words). Limiting its length forces the researcher to
100 Charmaz, supra note 93.

1o' Jack Katz, A Theory of Qualitative Methodology: The Social System of
Analytic Fieldwork, in EMERSON, supra note 81, at 131. See also Wangerin,
supra note 69, at 449 n. 83 ("If a case truly can be distinguished, it can also
be shown to be consistent with a related point and thus supportive of a
proposed argument.").
102 Remember, in logic, the answer you get depends upon the question you

present. Stated more generically, the way you come out depends on the way
you go in.
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think more critically by choosing the presumed operative facts
more carefully.
A tentative hypothesis is often critical for
03
counsel to find cases on point early in the research process.'
Begin your research reading the old seminal cases first.
Only by understanding the historical development of the law will
you develop a sense of how it will likely develop in the future.
Group the cases into two piles labeled favorable and unfavorable
(outcome is the dependent variable).
Then read each pile
separately, looking for common factors affecting the outcome.
You will often find that facts you thought were important, courts
have found are unimportant; and facts you thought were
unimportant, courts have found important. This is why the
hypothesis was only tentative, and as such will have to be
modified, possibly several times during the course the research.
Be careful to avoid vicious abstraction when drawing
analogies. Your search is to identify and explain the functional
equivalence among the noteworthy factors in the decided cases.
You do this by employing low level abstraction. Determine
whether systemic factors are present.
Consider scaling
(measuring) the material facts in the reported decisions based on
their importance to the outcome in the cases, and how often they
are present. Employing this structural-functional perspective will
enable the advocate to find similarities and make connections
between the cases that otherwise would not be seen.
Note that sometimes the cases do not fit within one
category.
If that occurs, the cases must be grouped into
categories based on similarity of factual settings, and more than
one general proposition of law or principle, derived from low
level abstraction, will have to be made. When this is done,
consolidate in an attempt create a more inclusive explanation of
the body of law. This is the manner in which theories are
developed. Segregating the principles may persuade the court not
to adopt the interpretation of the cases urged by the opponent. If
necessary, you should broaden your research to include analogous
103 This

idea is taken from BRYAN A. GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF 10-1 1(2'
Ed., Oxford University Press, 1999). Garner advocates limiting the issues to
75 words apiece.
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or similar statutes as a means to identify social value judgments
on the issue.
When reading several cases, attempt to categorize the
human interactions. Abstraction should try to identify the causes
of social conflict and systematic dysfunction. Analyzing the
conflict from an institutional or systemic perspective will often
expose a social dysfunction that needs to be addressed, which will
often suggest which way a court will decide. That is because
principles should be formulated in an effort to prevent future
social conflict and alleviate the social dysfunction. As Justice
Holmes said, "Think things and not mere words, for the latter are
the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and the time in which they
are used." 1 0 4 Therefore, in addition to searching for factual
similarities, try to understand the ramifications implicit in each
holding and its social utility. Assume that operating in the
subconscious of every judge is a value choice, based on what the
court is trying to accomplish, and decide whether it conforms to
social mores. Be aware that the court's decision may be right but
its analysis wrong. A court may make an artificial construction
merely to effectuate a perceived just result.
The tentative hypothesis method of research is also helpful
during brief writing. First, the advocate's final hypothesis
statement can be used as both the "Question Presented" and the
"Point Heading" in the brief. Second, by inverting the premises,
the final hypothesis can constitute the first two paragraphs under
the point heading. Specifically, the minor premise can be the
first paragraph after the point heading, while the major premise
can be the first sentence of the next paragraph. By this method.
the framework for the rhetorical structure of your argument can
easily be set up.
A sociological approach to the study and practice of law is
equally useful at the trial level. As cases come to court, the
parties present conflicting versions of the historical facts. The
in the
fact-finders must imaginatively places themseleves
positions of the parties, and from the parties' perspectives, decide
104Towne

v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1917).
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who was right and who was wrong. The job of the trial lawyer is
to identify to the jury a shared pattern of understanding (a
common ground that everyone can relate to) and to demonstrate
how his or her client acted based on the common understanding.
In other words, the lawyer must try to make sense of, and
provide a good reason -- a reason good to the factfmders -- why
the client acted in a particular manner. Studying law from a
functional, sociological perspective will enhance lawyers' abilities
to identify and explicate those shared patterns of social
understanding.
VIII. CAVEAT
In concluding, a few caveats are in order. There are
flaws in the courtroom process that frustrate scientific analysis.
First, there is no passive-observation of events. Witnesses testify
about historical facts. As such, memories are dimmed and
distorted by time or rumor, and unfortunately, perjury does
occur. Second, evidence is limited to what is admissible under
the rules of evidence. These rules limit admissible evidence to
that which is relevant to the claims and defenses raised by the
respective parties. Evidence rules also prevent introduction of
hearsay evidence because of its presumed untrustworthiness. As
such, "thick description" of the events, which is vital to fieldstudy research, is often lacking in court proceedings and in
judicial decisions. In his classic book, Courts on Trial, the late
Judge Jerome Frank said that the jury system removes the risk of
error from the government by placing it on the citizens so 1that
the
05
government is not held responsible when injustices occurs.
Those flaws are also an enigma on appeal. Because of the
vagueness and subjectivity inherent in the fact-finding process,
appellate courts review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party, and tend to report the facts in that light.
But notwithstanding the foregoing difficulties in applying
scientific models to legal research and analysis, as both Judge
,Cardozo and Karl Llewellyn said, we should nevertheless strive
105FRANK,
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toward a scientific approach to the study and practice of law.
Only in that manner will better analytical tools be developed to
assist the profession in helping the public discover the "truth"
and expose and correct social dysfunction.
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